Chapter 9
A New Strategy
pp. 173-186
Fidel Castro had survived with a small force of guerrilla fighters inthe Sierra Maestra for over a year. Isolated from the rest of the island,sustaining few casualties and supported by the urban underground of theM-26-7, Fidel was creating a well-disciplined group of guerrillas and gainingthe backing of the area's population. His mere presence in the Sierra Maestracontributed to his popularity with the people. Urban underground fighterswere unknown precisely because of the secret nature of their activities,and after the deaths of Frank País and José Antonio Echeverría,Fidel was the only important insurrectionary leader, urban or otherwise,left in Cuba. Militarily, he had demonstrated that one could wage guerrillawarfare in the mountains against a regular army; and in so doing he hadcreated a sanctuary for the urban cadres, a place where they could continuethe struggle rather than perish in the cities.
The DR's insistence upon conducting urban operations in accordance withthe theory of' "hitting at the top" did not altogether disappear from theminds of' some of the leaders, especially Faure Chomón. But it wasevident by late 1957 that a change in approach was as urgently needed.The organization had probably suffered more than any other in the urbanstruggle. It was the only movement to have lost all its leaders in a periodof one month--the tragic weeks of March and April 1957. The long perparatoryperiod before the attack on the Presidential Palace, the street demonstrations,acts of terrorism and direct confrontations with the police--all of whichhelped to develop a group of hard-core militants--also damaged the organization.The police had learned many of the cadre members' names and sought themout with pictures after the palace attack. The DR had to initiate a campaignfor new recruits and to try to reinstitute the cell structure of the organization.
After the attack on the palace and the Humboldt No. 7 killings, theexecutive council was reorganized. The new group included Primitivo Lima,Andrés Silva, Osmel Francis and Mary Pumpido among the voting professionals.The workers were represented by Pedro Martínez, Orlando Blanco andJorge Martín, who were leaders of action and sabotage cells andalso organizers within the labor movement. The council also included awomen's section represented by Fructuoso Rodríguez's widow, MartaJiménez.
Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo--the brother of Carlos, who had led thecommando group in the palace attack--was appointed chief of action in Havana.Under Eloy's leadership a new group of' urban cadre members emerged toreplace their dead compañeros, among them: Guillermo Jiménez,Angel Quevedo, Julio Fernández, Héctor Terry, Enrique Zamorano,Domingo Pérez, Jorge ("Mago") Robreño, and Mario ("Reguerita")Reguera.
In Las Villas province, Ramón Pando, president of the StudentFederation of the School of Commerce at Las Villas University, became theprovincial secretary general of the DR. With Enrique Villegas and PiroAbreu active throughout the province, the DR movement acquired a new impetusin central Cuba. Meanwhile, in Camagüey other militants emerged asimportant members of the urban organization, among them: Antonio ("Tony")Bastida, Florencio González, Adolfo Mora and Sergio Valle.
The DR recovered rapidly from its defeat and extended its cells intothe various sectors of the population reaching even well-to-do studentsat the Catholic Unversity of Villanova, where Jesús "Paulino" Barreirorepresented the DR. Although few of these students were willing to cooperate,those who did help were instrumental in creating the Fourth Guerrilla Frontin Pinar del Rio province. West of Havana, in late 1958.
The movement also organized overseas. With funds raised among exilesin Miami and other cities in the United States, the DR sent delegates tovarious Latin American countries. Venezuelan leader, Romulo Betancourt,José Figueres of Costa Rica and Juan José Arévaloof Guatemala aided the DR by publicly supporting the insurrection. Resultsof this support were impressive, opening new contacts throughout the areaand helping in the formation of delegations in Chile and in Caracas, Venezuela,following the fall of dictator Pérez Jiménez in early 1958.Delegations also existed in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Montevideo. Uruguay;Lima, Peru; Bogotá, Colombia; San José, Costa Rica: and inPanama, El Salvador and Mexico. In the United States there were delegationsin New York, Chicago, New Orleans, Tampa, Jacksonville and Miami. The Nassaudelegation was as able to extend its contacts throughout the Bahamas and,through the members of this important delegation. The DR developed itssystem for infiltrating people into Cuba, for conveying contraband arms,and for receiving information on the activities of the urban underground.
One of the important tasks of the delegations was to conduct publiccampaigns to discredit Batista's regime and to present the case for theinsurrection. As the tempo of these activities increased, U.S. authoritiesbegan to pay more attention to Cuban exiles in the Florida area. Federalauthorities sometimes succeeded in blocking arms shipments to Cuba; moreoften they were unsuccessful.
Under the leadership of Luis Blanca, Héctor Rosales, Carlos"Chino" Figueredo and Armando Fleites, the DR created a chain of' armsdepots that extended from New York City to New Orleans and from there toMiami. Arms were never concentrated in a specific place, and sites wherearms were gathered were usually outside the Spanish-speaking colonies.When a shipment left, several cars and trucks were used along the route,and deliveries were seldom made at the same place twice. False reportscirculated throughout the exile colony to confuse the authorities. However,the general feeling among DR militants was that U.S. authorities were simplylooking the other way as much as they possibly could.
The DR's Decision to Fight Guerrilla War
In September, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, the DR's chief of actionin Havana, arrived in Miami to discuss future strategy with Chomón,Cubela and Armando Fleites. The latter, a young physician and DR leaderin Las Villas province, agreed with Gutiérrez Menoyo on the needto adopt a guerrilla strategy counter to the "hit at the top" tactic. Chomónstill favored the direct action tactic, but agreed that the DR should changeits approach and open a guerrilla front in Cuba. Eloy GutiérrezMenoyo returned to Havana and left the capital for the Escambray Mountains,reaching that area in mid-October. Menoyo's task was to inspect the areaand to set up a guerrilla group; establish the necessary contacts withDR leaders in the surrounding towns and cities, and prepare the groundfor the arrival of a larger group of' DR militants. On November 10, 1957the guerrillas issued their first internal order declaring that a secondnational guerrilla front had been crcated and instructing the guerrillasto be loyal to the country, to keep all secrets of war, never to abandontheir weapons, and to denounce deserters and traitors. In January 1958,various small arms shipments arrived in Cuba and were rapidly distributedthroughout the various action cells, and some were transported to the EscambrayMountains. César Páez and Juan Figueroa, students who wereborn in Las Villas province, arrived in Havana and went to their nativeprovince to make contacts for future guerrilla actions. Pedro MartínezBrito, veteran of the Radio Reloj operation in 1957, infiltrated to Havanafrom Miami to acquaint DR cells of forthcoming operations against Batista.Meanwhile, Enrique Villegas, DR leader in the city of Sancti-Spiritus,in Las Villas, was shot to death by the army while he was taking suppliesto Menoyo's guerrilla group. The movement rapidly gathered military informationon government troops in Las Villas province, and on forces concentratedin posts close to the mountains.
On January 28, 1958, José Martí's birthday, the DR helda mass rally at Miami's Bayfront Park, scene of many such gatherings byCuban exiles. At that meeting, it was announced that Cuba would soon bein flames, and other pledges of future action were issued. Rumors of animpending invasion of Cuba circulated throughout the exile colony. Duringthe first week of February, the DR underground was placed on the alert,and various cells prepared to go into diversionary actions against thegovernment.
In the final hours before the expedition, reports circulated in theexile colony about an encounter between an army patrol and guerrillas atEscambray. Fearing that these guerrillas were Menoyo's, and that Batistawould mobilize the army to stop another Castro-like invasion, the DR gavethe plan for an expedition its final touches.
The Expedition
In Miami, the students had established contact with an American namedAlton Sweeting, captain of a pleasure yacht, the "Thor II," licensed inNew York. Captain Sweeting agreed to take the expedition to a point nearthe northern coast of Cuba. From there a rendezvous ship was to transportthe expeditionaries to the mainland, while Captain Sweeting's yacht wouldbe refueled for the trip back to Miami.
A few hours before departure, the authorities raided several placeswhere students usually gathered around Miami. They failed to make any arrests,but they did succeed in letting everyone know that they had to move immediately.To confuse the authorities, the expeditionaries selected the most conspicuousplace of departure, the Miami River. There, very close to the MacArthurCauseway which links Miami with Miami Beach, the Cubans gathered and boardedthe "Thor II." renamed "Escapade." The decision was made to carry fivetons of arms, thus reducing the number of expeditionaries to 15 men andone woman (Esther Martín). With its cargo the "Escapade" quietlycruised out of Miami.
The expedition was as a complete success, and coordination betweenthe exiles and the urban cadres was excellent. Captain Sweeting's cruiseranchored at Raccoon Cay off the northern coast of Cuba, and the expeditionaries\Acre transported further by a fishing boat, the "San Rafael." From themoment "Escapade" touched Raccoon Cay, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin'' was responsiblefor the operation. Close to the coast they boarded a third small craft,the "Yaloven," which carried men and supplies to the fishing village ofSanta Rita, close to the port of Nuevitas, in Camaguey province. On February8, 1958,12 the DR's small expeditionary force landed and rapidly movedinland toward the capital of' Camaguey province where they remained hiddenfor a day, in groups of two and three at various underground headquarters.
The expedition's cargo was at this point divided between arms to hetransported to the DR's underground in Havana, and arms suitable for mountainfighting. Antonio ("Tony") Bastida, manager of a transport fleet of' trucks,was in charge of delivering the arms in Havana. The urban underground received33 Thompsons, a .50 caliber machine gun, two .55 caliber anti-tank rifles,one shotgun, two .30 caliber machine guns, one M-3, two M-1s, a Winchesterrifle, one Browning automatic rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition for the anti-tankrifles, 2,000 capsules (30.06mm) and ammunition for .45 caliber pistols,and hand grenades. The would-be guerrilla fighters carried 50 Italian carbines,two "Stern" submachine guns, one Thompson, two M-3s, two Springfield rifles,one Garand rifle, one M-1, five semi-automatic Remington rifles with telescopicsights, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers.
The route leading from Camaguey to the Banao area in the Escambray Mountains(190 kilometers) had been traced by urban cadres. All along the \Nay cadremembers met the expeditionaries to render reports on the area they werestill to cover, and to pinpoint army positions. The urban cadre members-amongthem Ramon Pando and Piro Abreu, student leaders in Las Villas province-tooksupplies to the expeditionaries and sometimes added men to the group. Dr.Manuel Sori Marin was also very helpful in finding means of transportationfor the expeditionaries.
On February 13, the expeditionaries reached the Banao area in the subregionof the Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus mountains, to the southeast of Santa Clara,Las Villas' capital, and the next day the group reached the Cangalito hills-At 7 AM on February 15, they arrived at Cacahual, a small guerrilla campflanked by two hills, where Gutierrez Menoyo, William Morgan and otherguerrillas awaited the group. With Castro's experience at Alegria de Pioin mind, the expeditionaries place two observers on the hills surroundingCacahual. Two days later, the observers alerted the camp to five army scoutsapproaching Cacahual~ an ambush disposed of' three of the five soldiers,but the rest escaped. Fearing the arrival of' army reinforceincrits theexpeditionarics broke camp.
At this point there were 29 guerrillas marching in two separate groups.Fourteen guerrillas followed an old peasant guide named Cadenas, amongthem \Acre Rolando Cubela, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin, Dario Pedrosa, AlbertoMora and Efren Mur. The other group included, among others, Eduardo GarciaLavandero, Rodriguez Loeches, Chom*on, Luis Blanca, Armando Fleites, AlbertoBlanco, Menoyo, Ivan Rodriguez, Ramon Pando, Oscar Ruiz and William Morgan.
The second group of guerrillas marched toward the west and into themountain chain called Guamuhaya. On February 19, the guerrillas campedat a place where they were to meet the rest of' the expeditionaries. Someof the DR men were to separate from the main group and return to the citiesto wage urban guerrilla warfare. Ramon Pando and Alberto Blanco decidednot to wait for the rest and were led out of' the mountains by LeonardoBombino and a guide named Faustinito. They "ere intercepted by an armypatrol, and Ramon Pando was captured, but the others managed to escape.Pando was later assassinated by order of army Lieutenant Froilan Perez.I I
The two groups reunited at the Michelena forests, and the remaining27 men tried to escape the area and tile pursuing army. They marched until4 PM on February 19, when they camped at the forest of' "La Diana." Soonarmy troops approached along a path in the forest: at 4:45 PM the DR combatantsambushed them, in a 15-minute encounter killing 14 and wounding 16 soldiers."For the next 13 hours the guerrillas, led by Leonardo Bombino, marchedalong ravines until they managed to escape from the army. On February 24,safe from the army's pursuit, the DR leaders A rote a manifesto which theysigned on the 25th.
The Manifesto of Escambray
The DR's manifesto set forth the objectives of the struggle by announcingthat its strategy would be to conduct simultaneous urban and rural guerrillaA warfare against Batista. The DR would fight for the re-establishmentof the Constitution of 1940, and to open the way for a social revolution.Revolutionary unity was essential for the victory of the insurrection,and the DR proposed that a "party of the revolution" be organized afterBatista's overthrow. That party would gather "the real fighters who dailyrisk their lives fighting the dictatorship," and would guarantee that theconstitution and the laws were fulfilled. The need for violence was reaffirmed,for peace could only come through the waging of war. The pillars of thefuture revolution were to be education, administrative honesty, agrarianreform and industrialization. Internationally, the DR supported the formationof a federation of' Caribbean republics, an initial step toward the organizationof a confederation of American republics.
The insurrectionary struggle against Batista, maintained the DR, wasbut the continuation of the country's historical struggle for independencesince the nineteenth century. the DR viewed the insurrection as inspiredby Jose Marti's ideas, the nationalism of Antonio ("Tony") Guiteras andthe democratic principles of Jose Antonio Echeverria. The DR's fight wasnot only against Batista's regime, but also against -those who only a fewyears ago supported the Nazis on conquered land of Europe," a direct referenceto the Communists, who -today are playing Batista's game as vulgar puppets."The caste of old and young politicians would be swept away by the insurrectionas a fundamental requisite of social therapy.
On February 27, the guerrillas reached the mountains to the south ofSanta Clara, close to the cities of Placetas, Cabaiguan, Santa Clara andGuayos. At a peak called Tres Cruces, Chom*on, Alberto Blanco, Rosendo Yero,Rodriguez Loeches, Garcia Lavandero and Luis Blanca began their journeyback into the urban struggle. They were led by the peasant guide Bombinoand another peasant named Raul Rosa.
Although the DR had suffered severe casualties in the urban struggle,the theory of "hitting at the top" had not been discarded completely. FaureChom*on, Rodriguez Loeches and Eduardo Garcia Lavandero continued to urgethe DR to strike at the dictator. These men had been molded in the urbaninsurrection, men from the cities, whose insurrectionary outlook was directlyconnected with struggle in the center of power, Havana.
Consequently, when Rodriguez Loeches left his companeros to seek helpin the cities close to the Escambray Mountains, he felt "a sense of reliefand security," since as an urban fighter he felt "secure in my own environment."In Sancti-Spiritus, Loeches established contact with Piro Abreu througha lawyer, Emilio Morata. Abreu provided the insurrectionists with a carand with an experienced driver, Carlos Brunet. On the evening of March3, the group met at Fomentos with plans to reach the city of Placetas,and then move by bus to Havana.
As their car approached the city of' Placetas on the Central Highway,an army jeep and a car from the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM)closed the road to check on all cars. The DR militants sped through theSIM's barricade as the army's car sped after them. Suddenly, Brunet stoppedthe car; as the soldiers stepped out of theirs, Brunet started the caragain and the SIM agents opened fire. The men succeeded in escaping Placetas,heading east toward the city of Cabaiguan. Along the way, the driver refusedto continue what he viewed as a suicide mission; the car was stopped andBrunet and Rosendo Yero stayed behind while Alberto Blanco took the driver'sseat.
In minutes, the car approached the city of Cabaiguan where an army patrolwas waiting, signaling for them to stop. The soldiers "had all kind ofweapons," and as Blanco sped through the army's barricade "shots rang out,"and "pieces of glasses flew all over."" Garcia Lavandero fired his M-3rifle behind the driver while Chom*on, fired from the other window as thecar went through the army's blockade and into the city. Miraculously, theyescaped with Garcia Lavandero suffering only a minor wound in the shoulder.After a daring escape from Cabaiguan and several days of hiding with peasants,the group established contact with the urban underground again and reachedHavana. Despite their brush with death they "decidedly felt more securein the llano (plain)."" Once in Havana, Chom*on, met with Faustino P6rezto discuss the feasibility of a general strike.
The DR Guerrilla Front
As the student manifesto circulated throughout the island, the new guerrillafront gained importance. The Escambray Mountains were an excellent locationfor guerrilla warfare. The Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus subregion of the mountainrange was the second largest coffee-producing area on the island. The valleyssurrounding Escambray produced good crops of rice, beans and vegetables,guaranteeing the guerrillas a constant supply of food. The large coffeeplantations and cattle ranches also guaranteed a steady income throughrevolutionary taxes imposed during the campaign. The central Cuba locationguaranteed that many urban fighters could reach the Escambray Mountainsand participate in rural guerrilla warfare. To the southwest was the cityof Cienfuegos, long a bastion of resistance to Batista. From Cienfuegosmany young men joined the guerrillas, and intelligence reports about armymovements "ere gathered there and sent to the Escambray. The various sugarmills in the province, the DR's previous involvement with the sugar workersin Las Villas province, and the militancy of DR urban cadres in citiesand towns close to the mountains was a factor of great importance in thestabilization of the DR's guerrilla front.
The number of DR guerrillas increased steadily. Many experienced urbanfighters who had been identified by the regime's forces went to the mountainsfor the duration of the insurrection. Others went to the mountains butreturned to the cities, some because the life of a rural guerrilla wastoo devoid of "excitement," others because they could not work "ell ingroups of 20 or 30 and their individualism was too great a risk to thediscipline which must exist in a guerrilla unit. Many of these fightersdied in encounters with Batista's police. The DR's chief of action, EduardoGarcia Lavandero, was killed together with Pedro Martinez Brito duringthe summer of 1958; Jose Rodriguez Vedo, Raul Gonzalez Sanchez, Ramon GonzalezCoro and Mario ("Rcguerita") Reguera also died fighting the dictatorshipin the cities.
In the Escambray Mountains, the students received their baptism of'fire in encounters with the army at Fomento, Saltillo, Hanabanilla, Guiniade Miranda and the two battles of Pedrero, during the spring and summerof 1958. They also learned to walk in jungles, to get their bearings inthe area and to prepare ambushes, where their collective effort was paramount.The guerrilla's skills eventually led the army to follow the example oftheir comrades in the Sierra Maestra. The regular soldiers simply refusedto enter the mountains.
By the beginning of the summer, the DR controlled the Escambray Mountains.As their power over the area grew, their responsibilities increased andthe DR organized a civil administration. A comison campesina led by JuanMiranda, a peasant, was created and enlisted the support of most peasantsin the mountains. Under the direction of Pedro Martinez Larrinaga, a sugarworker, a population census was taken in the area for the first time inthe country's history. More than 50 schools were built, and all were functioningregularly by the end of the year. An educational unit administered by ProfessorGilberto Mediavilla was formed-Unidad Educacional Joe Westbrookwith graduatestudents in charge of programming and student teachers at all levels ofinstruction in the system. There was a department of Justice-Division LegalMenelao Mora-under the supervision of Dr. Humberto J. Gomez a criminallawyer and an officer in the DR guerrilla army. By the end of the insurrectionthe DR had created a department of public works and was building roadsthroughout the marginal areas of the Sierra del Escambray. Workers' brigadeswere organized to help in such endeavors as the maintenance of the threegun factories, and the schools, roads and hospitals.
The activities of the committee of the census and that of the campesinos"ere coordinated to create a system of' cattle distribution among the inhabitantsof Escambray and adjacent territories under the DR's control. A cattic-breedingcenter was formed under the direction of' professional veterinarians andstudents of the veterinary school from Havana University . The insurgentsbuilt two peasant homes for the elderly, and named them after Juan PedroCarbo Servia The Pepe Wanguemert Medical Division at the town of' Guiniade Miranda extended medical aid throughout the mountains. Towards December1958 the service had 15 field hospitals and ten ambulances, and treatedmore than 400 cases a month. Special attention was given to children'sdiseases, from intestinal parasites to leprosy. Cases of malnutrition werecommon; it was estimated that three out of five infants died before reachingthe age of two. Before these rather primitive facilities were established,pregnant women received no prenatal care, but instead went to the local"nurse," who was a sort of witchdoctor. Dentists at field hospitals workedwithout respite in eight-hour shifts, 24 hours a day. Although many ofthe peasant families had brothers, cousins and other relatives in the RuralGuards, the location of the guerrilla hospitals were never revealed tothe army. There were even times when regular soldiers, dressed in civilianclothes and accompanied by friends of the guerrillas, went to these medicalcenters for aid. There seems to be no doubt that through these activitiesthe guerrillas established an excellent relationship with the rural population,and that the harsh realization of the poverty of the peasants served toradicalize the students further.
There were also problems. The guerrillas tried to organize two agriculturalcooperatives, but the plan failed because the peasants refused to abandontheir own plots of land or even to discuss collective farming. The DR distributedland to peasants in the marginal areas of the Escambray Mountains, grantingimmediate title to peasants who requested land and who showed a desireto work. A department of agricultural affairs supervised the DR's agrarianreform and also offered technical advice in an attempt to teach the newproprietors methods of irrigation and the use of fertilizers. However,very seldom did the new owners folio" the suggestions of the technicians,and generally they made fun of those who tried to teach them how to plantcertain crops. Some students tried to conduct study groups to improve familyrelations, in an attempt to decrease the machista attitude of the peasantmen towards their women. The project was discarded when no men attendedthe study groups, and one of the volunteers for the project alertewd hiscompaneros that the peasants were taking their advice as an insult. Thenew generation of Cuban insurrectionists was learning the social valuesof the peasants and their religious dogmas; not only were they being confrontedwith all their problems at once, but also with the realization that thepeasants were quite a conservative group. The students learned to differentiatetheory from practice, and to understand the complexity of problems involvedin a seemingly easy family project which the students conceived as beneficialto the peasants, but which the latter viewed as prejudicial to their owntraditions.
The DR established a good communication system. It was based upon atelephone network which covered about 20 square kilometers, linking advanceposts with headquarters. Maintenance was handled by a group of techniciansof the Cuban Telephone Company, who left the urban underground to jointhe guerrillas in Escambray. The DR had two radio stations, and by thefall of 1958 these were linked with mobile units that reported the campaignleading to the battle of Santa Clara.
BY mid-August 1958 the regular army would not even approach the marginalareas of the Escambray Mountains. However, during the fall of 1958, thearmy made an attempt to cut the guerrilla front in half by advancing simultaneouslyfrom the city of Cienfuegos towards the north, and from Santa Clara tothe south. The army's sudden decision to fight the guerrillas was probablydue to the arrival of Battalion No. 11, whose chief, Colonel Angel SanchezMosquera, was transferred from Oriente to Las Villas province. In theorythe main objective was to isolate the guerrillas who had been operatingin the western sector of the mountains and had attacked various army postsin the area, moving too close to the city of Cienfuegos. However, aftertwo weeks of futile marching the army withdrew, leaving a few dead, somewounded, and plenty of' arms and ammunition. This brief and useless operationallowed the guerrillas to capture dozens of automatic rifles, substantialamounts of ammunition, secret codes and even a tank.
In September 1958 approximately 800 guerrillas were operating in Escambray,with about 150 recruits in training and 50 messengers taken from amongthe youth in the area. As government persecution increased in the citiesmore urban militants went to the mountains. It was difficult to get tothe Sierra Maestra or to the Sierra Cristal, but it "as relatively easyto reach the Escambray Mountains. Some activists of the M-26-7 also tookrefuge there because the rebel army in the Sierra Maestra would acceptonly a select number into the ranks of the guerrillas. Tile Escambray forceswere larger, but Castro's 300 fighters had the advantage of' being unitedunder one command, his. Castro would not allow any violation of the guerrillacode to threaten the group's unity. His policy was to limit the guerrillafighters to a manageable number.
Internal Division
In July 1958 Faure Chom*on returned to the Escambray Mountains to finda conflict between Rolando Cubela and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo over the rightof leadership,. Menoyo refused to accept Cubela as head, of' the guerrillafighters, and he also rejected Chom*on's insistence on "hitting at the top,"as a useless spilling of blood. Menoyo protested sending arms I to theurban underground, claiming that all the arms were needed by the ruralguerrillas.
The leadership conflict in the mountains had a number of roots. Onewas that Menoyo's membership in the DR dated back to 1957, and althoughhe had done a tremendous amount of organizational work as chief of actionin Havana, Cubela was a founding member of the organization, and withinthe DR's tradition he, not Menoyo, had the right to the top position inthe Escambray Mountains. Menoyo's claim to leadership was based on thefact that he had been the first DR guerrilla to reach the mountains. Theorganization found by the DR expeditionaries upon their arrival in centralCuba had been created by Menoyo. The conditions for the establishment ofa guerrilla front, the contacts with the peasantry, the selection of sitesfor guerrilla camps, the knowledge of the terrain, and the contacts withthe DR
cadres in surrounding urban areas were all the product of Menoyo'sdedicated work. Menoyo's claim clashed with Cubela's long standing as aDR leader, and with Chom*on's leadership as the secretary general of themovement. But if experience as a guerrilla fighter had been consideredas the prerequisite for leadership, then Menoyo, not Chom*on, had the rightto lead the DR's new phase of struggle.
The solution was simple: Faure Chom*on, stayed in the mountains as thesecretary general of the DR, and I Rolando Cubela was reconized asthe military leader of the DR. The executive committee of the DR supportedChom*on's position, and Menoyo announced that he was leaving the organizationto create his own group of guerrilla fighters. Chom*on, then repeatedthe same charge that had been passed down after the palace attack, whenJorge Valls and Tirso Urdanivia, among
others, were expelled as traitors. Chom*on charged Menoyo with treason,proclaimed his expulsion from the DR, and settled down to direct the guerrillacampaign with Cubela.
The division within the DR guerrilla army reflected the absence of thecharismatic leadership of Jose Antonio Echeverria. Echeverria had maintainedthe control of the organization from its inception to the palace attackand his death: second-level leaders like Chom*on and Menoyo appear to haveinspired less respect on the part of the militants, and were more subjectto criticism. The surviving leaders of the DR appear to have completelylacked the unique qualities which characterized Fidel Castro and made himnot only an excellent insurgent, but also an astute politician.
The DR had suffered two serious setbacks: the palace attack and theChom*on-Menoyo split. It may be that the palace attack was the product ofamateurish planning. but the Chom*on-Menoyo split was the result of themediocrity of the surviving members of the DR.
The Second Front of Escambray
Because of the conflict between leaders, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo formedthe Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray. At this point he attained therank of major. William Morgan, 11 a former U.S. Marine, was also a commanderand close to Gutierrez Menoyo. Also backing the- Second Front was Max Lesnik,a radio commentator and politician who disliked Chom*on and Castro. Otherguerrilla fighters, most of whom had an Autentico background, joined theSecond Front of Escambray. The main financial backing came from formerpresident Prio, whose contact with Gutierrez Menoyo was Lazaro Artola,an Autentico and an admirer of the former president.
This guerrilla group was characterized by its lack of bureaucracy andby its highly mobile units. Its general staff included Majors Armando Fleites,William Morgan, Lazaro Artola, Alfredo Pena, Genaro Arroyo, Jesus Carreraand Gutierrez Menoyo as chief."
The guerrilla army of the Second Front performed quite well during theremaining months of the insurrection. It had various encounters with theregular army, inflicting 37 casualties at La Diana. At Charco Azul, 30soldiers were killed, and in the Rio Negro commando raid, 40 Rural Guardswere shot to death and over 100 wounded. The encounters of Guanayara, Manantiales,Dos Became Jibacoa, San Blas, Hanabanilla, the second attack against theRio Negro army post, and the encounters of Soledad, Guaos and La Moza helpedto raise the prestige of the organization, and to consolidate its territory1.39
Towards the end of the insurrection, while "Che" Guevara and the DRencircled Santa Clara, Major Gutierrez Menoyo's army attacked the regulartrrops at Topes de Collantes, and fought the regular army at Camanayagua,Manicaragua, Barajagua, San Fernando de los Camarones, Guaos, Hormigueroand El Hoyo until the army sought refuge inside the city of Cienfuegos.But the approximately 300 guerrillas under his command did not have a definiteideology, nor was the group a disciplined political organization. Its solepurpose was to overthrow Batista.
The division within the ranks of the DR had come at a critical time.Eight hundred guerrillas united under a single command could have createdhavoc with the regular army; instead, the divisiveness weakened the DR.The guerrilla movement remained divided in the Escambray Mountains, andwas not to unite even after "Che" Guevara's arrival in I-as Villas provincein October 1958. Gutierrez Menoyo did not change his position toward Chom*onChom*on continued to charge Menoyo with treason; and "Che" took Chom*on'sside but paid attention to his main task: to defeat the regular army.
Castro did not need to worry about internal divisions over militaryand political strategy. Although the M-26-7 militants complained of' Castro'sdictatorial attitude, harsh discipline in its ranks and absolute centralizationof command, the M-26-7 was monolithic by the end of 1958. This was themost important factor in the future course of the insurretion; for in insurrections,discipline is of paramount importance.
